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Abstract
This article – based on a larger study (Pawelec 2009) – has two aims. The more limited 
one is to present network models proposed by Ronald Langacker and George Lakoff. 
I try to show that both ventures rest on manifestly different assumptions, contrary to 
the widespread view that they are convergent or complementary. Langacker’s declared 
aim is “descriptive adequacy”: his model serves as a global representation of linguistic 
intuitions, rooted in convention. Lakoff, on the other hand, offers a developmental model: 
a fairly general abstract schema is “imagistically” specified and transformed, while the 
more specific schemas serve as the basis for metaphorical transfers. My wider aim is 
to offer a preliminary assessment of theoretical justifications and practical potential 
of network models in lexical semantics.
1. Introduction
In a more comprehensive work (Pawelec 2009), I offered a case study of prepositional 
polysemy, as represented in selected network models. The present article – based 
on the book – summarizes some basic issues underlying network modelling and 
attempts an assessment of its theoretical justifications and practical potential. If the 
observations presented below seem sketchy, I can only refer the reader to the ac-
count mentioned (it is to be understood, however, that my approach is exploratory 
throughout: my aim is to probe rather than pass verdicts).
The label “network models” is used here as a shorthand expression for the cogni-
tive approach to the representation of lexical “senses” sometimes called “prototype 
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semantics” (e.g. Kleiber [1990] 2003). The term is borrowed from computational 
attempts to represent semantic knowledge, which constitute a related field (on rela-
tions between “concepts”, as opposed to linguistic “senses”, cf. Evens 1988). Network 
models in the meaning investigated here constitute a family of formats for repre-
senting polysemy. Since cognitive linguistics (henceforth, CL) views lexical and 
grammatical categories as a continuum and explains both in semantic terms, such 
networks normally cross standard morphosyntactic boundaries.
This general description of the field requires some comment. When stating that 
network models represent lexical “senses”, one takes for granted the standard po-
sition adopted in lexical semantics: words have distinct meanings which can be 
ascribed to them out of the context of use. It is assumed both in the new cognitive 
paradigm, as well as in the more traditional schools (neostructuralist and genera-
tivist ones), to which it is usually opposed, that words have “senses” which can be 
analysed in isolation. Without this assumption, arguably central for the very exist-
ence of lexical semantics, “the rationale for distinguishing lexical from sentence / 
utterance semantics would evaporate” (Zlatev 2003: 454).1 Thus, the distinction 
reveals a gap between word senses, as represented out of context, and their mean-
ings in use (or construals).
The assumption that words – or, more generally, conventional linguistic units 
(henceforth, CLU), e.g. nominal cases – have senses may lead in several directions. 
One could ask, first, about the nature of polysemy, i.e. the processes which result in 
the proliferation of a CLU’s senses. Second, one could enquire about the diagnostic 
criteria of a CLU’s polysemy, especially in view of the proposed distinction between 
semantic “senses” and pragmatic “construals”. Third, a linguist could be primarily 
interested in offering the most adequate way to represent the sense(s) of various 
CLUs. These issues are clearly intertwined. I will focus on the last one, as it provides 
a convenient vantage point on the genesis and goals of network modelling, while 
the remaining ones will be touched upon when appropriate.
2. the rationale behind network models
There are alternative justifications of this venture provided by the “founding fathers” 
of prototype semantics – George Lakoff and Ronald Langacker.
Lakoff’s declared aim is incredibly ambitious and extends far beyond the domain 
of linguistics. He wants to provide an alternative to “the traditional view” about the 
nature of language, mind and reality (which he calls “objectivism”), 
which is tied to the classical theory [of categorization, according to which] categories 
are defined in terms of common properties of their members (Lakoff 1987: xii).
1 It is not obvious to what extent Zlatev’s formulation covers some dynamic approaches to lexi-
cal meaning, which treat word meanings out of context as e.g. “pre-meanings” (Croft, Cruse 
2004: 97ff.) or “parameterised lexical concepts” (Dunbar 1991: 112ff.), since such theoretical 
constructs require actualization to get some specific content. In such cases the postulated 
distinction between “senses” and “construals” is problematic.
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The theory of prototypes (developed to a large extent on the basis of Eleanor Rosch’s 
work) is to serve as a lynchpin of a new view, bringing forth a revolution in philoso-
phy and science. Wider implications of Lakoff’s proposal go far beyond the present 
context [I analysed that ideological project (Pawelec 2005)].
As concerns language, in his opus magnum Lakoff says:
One of the principal claims of this book is that language makes use of our general 
cognitive apparatus. If this claim is correct, two things follow:
– Linguistic categories should be of the same type as other categories in our concep-
tual system. In particular, they should show prototype and basic-level effects.
– Evidence about the nature of linguistic categories should contribute to a general 
understanding of cognitive categories in general. Because language has such a rich 
category structure and because linguistic evidence is so abundant, the study of 
linguistic categorization should be one of the prime sources of evidence for the 
nature of category structure in general (Lakoff 1987: 58).
It seems that Lakoff merely assumes that linguistic categories are like “other categories 
in our conceptual system” and are structured around prototypes, or “radially struc-
tured”. Additionally, he treats prototype (radial) models in semantics as evidence for 
the existence of prototype-based categorization (a linguist’s fallacy). As he puts it: 
polysemy appears to be a special case of prototype-based categorization, where the senses 
of the word are the members of a category. The application of prototype theory to the study 
of word meaning brings order into an area where before there was only chaos [… and] 
demonstrates the reality of radially structured categories(Lakoff 1987: 378–9).
As I will try to show, both claims are not just overstated, but simply false: earlier 
analyses of polysemy did order the linguistic data in useful ways (although at a higher 
level of abstraction), while the radial format is not an unambiguous improvement; 
what is more, a new format of representation is merely a new way of approaching 
phenomena: it does not prove the reality of proposed entities and relations, while 
its adequacy must be tested against competing accounts.
Langacker, on the other hand, notices in a matter-of-fact fashion that: 
Much in language is a matter of degree. […] Nondiscrete aspects of language structure 
must be accommodated organically in the basic design of an adequate linguistic theory 
(Langacker 1987: 14).
He subsequently raises the issue “whether the criterial-attribute model or the pro-
totype model offers a better account of linguistic categorization”. As he explains:
The criterial-attribute model characterizes a class by means of a list of defining 
features (conventionally represented in square brackets – A.P.); in its strict form, 
it requires that every member of the class fully possess every property on this list, 
and that no nonmember possess all of the listed properties. Class membership is thus 
an all-or-nothing affair; a sharp distinction is presumed between those entities that 
are in the class and those that are not.
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Langacker points out three “well-known problems” with this model. First, some in-
dubitable members of a category may lack attributes intuitively judged criterial for it 
(e.g. flightless birds). Second, a set of features sufficient to delimit a category, i.e. “to pick 
out all and only the members” of a class, “might still be incomplete and inadequate 
as a characterization of that class” (e.g. “[featherless] [biped]” as defining humans). 
And third, in actual use the criterial attributes are not judged necessary to ascribe class 
membership. For instance, a baseball which is the wrong colour is still called a baseball. 
According to Langacker, the prototype model avoids these problems. First,
it does not require that every member of a category possess a given feature (or even 
that there be any salient property shared by all members).
Second, 
the characterization problem is avoided because the prototype model is not inher-
ently minimalist in spirit; instead it encourages the fullest possible characterization 
of prototypical instances, if only to specify the basis for assimilating the full range 
of nonprototypical instances to a category.
And third,
the prototype model allows an entity to be assimilated to a category if a person 
finds any plausible rationale for relating it to prototypical members (Langacker 
1987: 14–17).
Thus, Langacker’s preference for prototype models is based on the assumption that the 
criterial-attribute model is not adequate for representing linguistic phenomena.
Both accounts are superficially similar – in proposing prototype models in prefer-
ence to discrete models in semantics – while being different in important respects. 
Crucially, Langacker’s view that linguistic categories may require special treatment 
because of “the organization and complexity of the linguistic data” (Langacker 
1987: 17) seems opposed to Lakoff’s assumption that they are like “other categories 
in our conceptual system” (Lakoff 1987: 58). Furthermore, Langacker’s approach is 
primarily descriptive: in his view, the prototype model provides a more adequate 
representation of a range of linguistic phenomena than the criterial-attribute model. 
Lakoff believes that the prototype model is explanatory: that it shows how language 
and mind work. Consequently, Langacker’s aim is to overcome some limitations 
of the structuralist representations of CLUs, while Lakoff (inexplicably) offers his 
radial model as a representation of conceptual structures.
The notion of “linguistic categorisation” plays a central but rather opaque role 
in the remarks quoted above. Taylor, who used the phrase as the title of his book 
(the first monograph presenting prototype approach in CL), pointed out its ambi-
guity. Whenever we use the same word to refer to various specimens of something, 
we categorize, or name “sameness in difference” (Taylor 1989: vii). Since words can 
refer to linguistic entities, “linguistic categorisation” may be not only about categories 
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pointed out verbally in the world, like DOG, but also about linguistic categories, like 
WORD or LEXEME. To distinguish between these cases, in the latter one, which 
Taylor calls “reflexive” (Taylor 1989: viii), Rúa proposes to talk about “metalinguistic 
categories” (Rúa 2003: 46).
Let us notice, however, that this disambiguation does not seem to address the 
crucial issue. When Langacker mentioned the problem facing the linguist: “the or-
ganization and complexity of linguistic data”, he did not mean linguistic categories 
like WORD or LEXEME, but rather linguistic phenomena, e.g. polysemous words 
with a number of conventional meanings. While it makes sense to use the term “meta-
linguistic categories” to refer to folk (e.g. WORD) or expert (e.g. LEXEME) categories 
in some ways ordering linguistic data, this description does not seem obviously ap-
plicable to the data. In his exposition, Taylor disregards this point since he assumes 
(together with Lakoff) that linguistic objects are like non-linguistic objects:
Just as a botanist is concerned with a botanical categorization of plants, so a lin-
guist undertakes a linguistic categorization of linguistic objects. The second half of 
the book, in particular, will address the parallels between linguistic categorization 
in this second sense, and the categorization, through language, of the non-linguistic 
world. If, as will be argued, categories of linguistic objects are structured along the 
same lines as the more familiar semantic categories, then any insights we may gain 
into the categorization of the non-linguistic world may be profitably applied to the 
study of language structure itself (Taylor 1989: viii).
Rúa takes Taylor to task for treating what she calls “metalinguistic categories” on 
a par with other kinds of categories. She claims that linguistic categorisation proper 
involves objects which are “intrinsically” linguistic, rather than “additionally” lin-
guistic. As she explains:
In simple terms, one thing is categorizing objects which have a concrete or abstract 
correlate in the world, and subsequently resorting to language in order to express 
the result of that categorization […]; a different thing is categorizing objects which 
lack this correlate, or simply do not make sense in isolation from the system they 
belong to (i.e. from language) (Rúa 2003: 32).
Consequently, Rúa postulates three types of “linguistic categories” (a superordinate, 
neutral term):
(a) Metalinguistic categories (purely linguistic): they must be assigned a linguistic 
expression; 
(b) Semilinguistic categories: they are subdivided into cognitive linguistic (bird) and 
perceptual linguistic (red), since the latter type is highly dependent on sensory 
perception. Their linguistic expression is expected as a natural complement;
(c) Extralinguistic categories (purely cognitive/perceptual): their linguistic expres-
sion is possible but not strictly required (Rúa 2003: 33).
Rúa’s classification seems to be rather ad hoc. It is quite obvious, for instance, that 
what would be an “extralinguistic” category in one language, could be a “semi-
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linguistic” one in another, if conventionally expressed (rich evidence is provided 
by studies in the domain of colour perception and expression). But her point is 
consonant with Langacker’s concern: “purely linguistic” categories – linguistic 
phenomena – may have unique properties which require special treatment. Still, 
the term “metalinguistic categories” is an unusual label for “natural” linguistic 
categories (as opposed to reflexive metacategories). Rúa (2003: 33) is aware of this 
problem: “there are problematic cases of difficult ascription (what kind of ‘ob-
jects’ are categorized under over or hate?)”, she wonders (I termed such “objects” 
CLUs – I will return to their status later). It is legitimate to ask, then, in what sense 
linguistic objects – e.g. polysemous words – are “categories”? What is their “same-
ness in difference”?
To sum up, both Langacker and Lakoff call into question the classical categorial 
approach to linguistic phenomena (specifically, polysemy), as practised by pre-
vious structuralist schools (“autonomous semantics”). Lakoff does it in the name of 
a revolutionary theory of categorization and concept formation which he inferred 
from Rosch’s experiments on “prototype effects” (contrary to her own position on 
their significance), and has been applying with his associates to several disciplines 
(cf. Lakoff 1996; Lakoff, Turner 1989; Lakoff, Johnson 1999; Lakoff, Núñez 2001). 
Langacker’s guiding principle is descriptive adequacy. In his treatment of linguis-
tic categorization he points out some aspects of phenomena which have not been 
captured by earlier theorists.
3. What are linguistic categories?
As we have seen, the issue of categorisation looms large in the justifications be-
hind network modelling. Lakoff is opposed to the “classical” view that the aim of 
categorisation is to find a unique place for each entity (its category) in an overall 
taxonomy (a hierarchy of categories). Following Aristotle, to define something is to 
find its genus proximum (the closest type it belongs to) and to point out its differentia 
specifica (its distinguishing features). This is a properly theoretical task: one is after 
a transparent and comprehensive account of relations between entities. Lakoff, on the 
other hand, believes that categories are embodied: they reflect recurrent types of 
experience (and subsequent conceptual extensions).
Rather than criticise Lakoff’s views (cf. Pawelec 2005), let me point out in the 
present context a crucial difference between the theoretical quest for a rational 
description of reality and practical attempts to make sense of it, to “domesticate” it 
conceptually. In his attack on classical categories, Lakoff overlooks this basic distinc-
tion: between “expert” and “folk” categorisation, between the theoretical and the 
pragmatic stance to phenomena. Prototype effects studied by Rosch (e.g. whether 
a chair or an ashtray is a better example of the category FURNITURE) do not reflect 
theoretical judgements; they are symptoms of a pragmatic need for cognitive refer-
ence points in everyday life and communication. Consequently, they do not pose 
a challenge to the classical theory.
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We may notice that Langacker, in his criticism of the criterial-attribute (or “clas-
sical”) model quoted above, commits related errors. His first argument – that “some 
indubitable members of a category may lack attributes intuitively judged criterial 
for it” – ignores the distinction between folk and expert categories (“intuitively cri-
terial” refers to a folk assessment, while experts search for necessary and sufficient 
criteria). The second argument misrepresents the nature of expert categorisation: 
its aim is not a unique description of a class but locating the class in a taxonomy 
(as in Aristotle’s definition). The last argument mistakenly assumes that theoretical 
definitions of word “senses” should be taken to determine their meanings in use, 
or “construals”.
Once we see that there is nothing wrong, in principle, with classical categories, 
let us ask about the “sameness in difference” of linguistic categories, specifically 
polysemous CLUs. I will follow Langacker’s account. In his treatment of linguistic 
categorisation he points out two crucial aspects of phenomena, which must be 
taken account of: variability and conventionality. Since CLUs are generally vari-
able both in form and meaning, he thinks it is best to analyse their phonological 
and semantic poles as “complex categories”. These categories are complex because 
“they group together, and treat as equivalent for certain purposes, a variety of 
distinct and sometimes quite disparate elements”. As a result, “membership is 
commonly a matter of degree, resistant to strict delimitation, and subject to the 
vicissitudes of linguistic convention” (Langacker 1987: 369–370).
It is important to realize that Langacker’s description (of the semantic pole) 
refers to the internal structure of a complex category. The ascription of an ele-
ment to a complex category is unproblematic, as it is based on its form (if one 
discounts the issue of homonymy, when historically different word forms converge 
or happen to be identical). Thus, the sameness in question is of a genetic kind, 
as in a family: some individuals bear the same name, because they come from the 
same stock or belong to a single family tree. Consequently (to invoke terms used 
by logicians), the “extension” of a family name – the class of referents covered 
by it – is normally not problematic, as it is guaranteed by convention (assuming 
one can keep track of historical relatedness and knows the rules of exclusion and 
inclusion, e.g. adoption2). Linguists, however, are primarily concerned (in the case 
investigated here) with the “intension” of a lexeme: its meaning / set of related 
meanings. By definition, a polysemous lexeme (called “a complex category” by 
Langacker) comprises a set of different senses, thus – apparently – it cannot have 
one intension. It is not a symbolic unit as defined by Langacker (a form / meaning 
pair), since it unites a more or less fuzzy set of formally identified symbolic units 
(which I termed a CLU).
To sum up, a polysemous lexeme is a category extensionally: as a set of ge-
netically related, formally homogeneous symbolic units – a “natural category” of 
2 Adoption provides an analogy to the convergence of historically different word forms (homo-
n ymy). If they converge because language users see a similarity between their senses, then 
the distinction between polysemy and homonymy is no longer secure. 
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senses.3 Intensionally, it is unlikely to be a category. There is no obvious “sameness 
in difference” when one juxtaposes e.g. two senses of game: 1. a sport; 2. animals 
hunted for fun (a metonymical extension of 1.). A very general, disjunctive defini-
tion: “ACTIVITIES performed / ANIMALS hunted for fun” is not informative and 
it cannot delimit a category (except perhaps one borrowed from Borges).
4. Approaching polysemy
Let us return now to our initial question: what is the most adequate way for a lin-
guist to tackle the polysemy of a CLU? Three general answers have evolved, which 
may be termed the homonymy, polysemy and monosemy position. As pointed out 
by Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, the monosemy position (espoused by neostructural-
ists) strives for the most parsimonious or schematic representation (a single sense), 
while the homonymy position (associated with generativists) is primarily concerned 
with deriving (any number of) senses from sets of matrices of linguistic properties 
(Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk 2007: 152). Thus, both approaches apparently disregard 
the phenomenon of polysemy, or natural (historical, conventional) relatedness of 
senses of a CLU – for different reasons (I will return to the polysemy position at the 
end of this section, and I will present it in detail in the subsequent one).
Since generativists are concerned with the necessary conceptual “underlying 
reality of language” (cf. Katz 1971), they are not interested in the historical (contin-
gent) relatedness of senses. Using combinations of atomic properties, they represent 
actual / posited senses primarily not as related, but as partially opposed to each other. 
This approach is based on the structuralist assumption that a finite set of distinc-
tive features is enough to characterise all existing (and imaginable) senses. Hence, 
a rational model is to be preferred to a historical reconstruction. One may point 
out, however, that this Platonic view of language notoriously results in a neglect of 
its surface manifestations.
The motivation for the monosemy position is more complex and important be-
cause it goes back to the original statement of the structuralist agenda by Saussure, 
who was concerned to define a properly linguistic object of study. Saussure argued 
for a synchronic approach to language, as opposed to then prevalent diachronic 
approach. What are the grounds for a linguist to focus on language as a state? First, 
since a succession of historical developments “does not exist insofar as the speaker 
is concerned”, a linguist “can enter the mind of speakers only by completely sup-
pressing the past” (Saussure 1959: 81). Saussure clearly assumes that the “reality” 
of language is in the present state of the mind of its speakers and that it must be 
captured without reference to past states. He also argues that the opposition between 
the synchronic and the diachronic view “is absolute and allows no compromise”, 
since individual changes become operative only when integrated into the system 
3 The term is Lakoff’s (1987: 418) but in his use “natural” refers to purely psychological or 
conceptual relationships, which are devoid of a historical and social dimension (cf. Pawelec 
2009: 70–71, note 28 for a critique).
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(Saussure 1959: 83). Second, the system of language is based on the synchronic no-
tion of “value”, as illustrated by a comparison with chess:
Take a knight, for instance. By itself is it an element in the game? Certainly not, for 
by its material make-up – outside […] the game – it means nothing to the player; 
it becomes a real, concrete element only when endowed with value and wedded to it. 
Suppose that the piece happens to be destroyed or lost during a game. Can it be re-
placed by an equivalent piece? Certainly. Not only another knight but even a figure 
shorn of any resemblance to a knight can be declared identical provided the same 
value is attributed to it. We see then that in semiological systems like language, where 
elements hold each other in equilibrium in accordance with fixed rules, the notion 
of identity blends with that of value and vice versa (Saussure 1959: 110).
This analogy shows that a material entity (a knight in chess or a phonic sequence 
in language) gets a specific meaning only in a field of relations with other elements: 
there are no atomic meanings (contrary to the generativist reinterpretation of struc-
turalism). Once it acquires its identity, the material shape is secondary – it can be 
replaced by something else – as long as the system remains operative.4 Thus, value 
and identity of elements are inextricably linked. In this way we get to the notion of 
“the unity of the sign”, which is crucial in our context:
Without language, thought is a vague, unchartered nebula. There are no pre-existing 
ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language […]. The charac-
teristic role of language with respect to thought is not to create a material phonic 
means for expressing ideas but to serve as a link between thought and sound, under 
conditions that of necessity bring about the reciprocal delimitations of units. Thought, 
chaotic by nature, has to become ordered in the process of its decomposition. Neither 
are thoughts given material form nor are sounds transformed into mental entities; 
the somewhat mysterious fact is rather that “thought-sound” implies division, and 
that language works out its units while taking shape between two shapeless masses 
(Saussure 1959: 112).
Thus, language is “the domain of articulations” – each unit is an “articulus”, a mem-
ber, a subdivision in a larger sequence (Saussure 1959: 112–113). From this point of 
view, Saussure argues that the nature of material used for symbolizing is secondary 
(whether phonic or gestural, as in sign languages), since “what is natural to mankind 
is not oral speech, but the faculty of constructing a language, i.e. a system of distinct 
signs corresponding to distinct ideas” (Saussure 1959: 10). Once an idea is articulated, 
one may talk of “pairing” between material and conceptual chunks (as in “nomen-
claturism”), while language is primarily a structured system of differences.
In this way we get to the most difficult point: “in language there are only dif-
ferences without positive terms” (Saussure 1959: 120; emphasis in the original). 
4 Presumably (as minimal requirements in the chess context), the new material entity must 
differ in form from other elements and the changes cannot be too numerous. If we apply this 
perspective to language, we can see that formal oppositions – crucial in a genetic context – 
lose much of their importance in further history, once they are integrated into the system. 
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The “pairings” specify “significations”, i.e. concepts which may refer to something in 
the world. However, this most obvious function of linguistic units is founded on their 
more basic differentiation. They may get to mean something only when integrated 
with existing units as opposed to them in some respects within a system of such op-
positions: “In language, as in any semiological system, whatever distinguishes one 
sign from others constitutes it” (Saussure 1959: 121). Consequently, Saussure defined 
the “linguistic point of view” as an attempt to capture the system of oppositions 
which underlies the use of a language, while not being directly influenced by all 
its uses and vagaries. As pointed out by a commentator: “[the whole array of Saus-
surean concepts] has a common aim: to separate the linguistic point of view from 
any direct relationship with the ‘real’ world” (Normand 2004: 104). To sum up, for 
Saussure, the essence of language lies in the combination of sound and thought – 
not “pairing” (which produces “nomenclature”, or a list of words) but “reciprocal 
delimitation”. Consequently, the sign can be a vehicle of meaning – in the system of 
oppositions – only if it preserves this unity (one-to-one relationship between signans 
and signatum). Hence, apparently, the justification for the monosemy position.
Let us notice, however, that the notion of “the unity of the sign” seems neces-
sary only in some primary genetic context: a new sign (morpheme) cannot arise 
without a simultaneous double articulation of its phonic and semantic poles in 
their respective fields of differences. Once a sign is established, it enters into rela-
tions with other signs and can be put to extended uses. For instance, if the name of 
an animal is conventionally applied to humans, that sign contracts relations with 
signs denoting human activities. Thus, a sign may transform / develop its identity 
(or spawn related signs, to stick to the family analogy) without any modulation of 
the phonological pole – the source of polysemy. This can be detected in the linguis-
tic system by inspecting the range of its syntagmatic relationships. Consequently, 
one may argue that the notion of “the unity of the sign” is preserved, but at a more 
complex structural level: “the new sign” is revealed in all those syntagmatic units 
which carry the modified sense.
Against this background, one may point out a difference between the monosemy 
and the polysemy positions. The former one looks for internal, systematic reasons 
to distinguish signs. Since a given phonic sequence is a prima facie reason that one 
deals with a single sign (discounting historical homonymy), the monosemy position 
reflects a reluctance to view any specific range of syntagmatic relationships as indica-
tive of a new sense. Those ranges which have a clearly different formal status within 
the system will be treated in this way, e.g. mother as a noun and as a verb. But oth-
erwise one will try to cover with a single intension (definition) as many instances as 
possible. Only those cases which resist such unifying efforts are assumed to merit 
the status of a new sign – distinguished by its syntagmatic potential (thus, not in 
contravention of “the unity of the sign” principle).
The polysemy position, as represented by CL, adopts an external view on lin-
guistic structure as symptomatic of prior cognitive processes. It is motivated both 
by apparent inadequacies of structuralism and by the conviction that language is 
a window on conceptual structure.
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5. representing polysemy: Langacker vs. Lakoff
Langacker argues for a nonreductive, usage-based model of symbolic meaning: even 
though a theorist rightly aims at a generalization, s/he should not eschew enumerat-
ing established senses covered by it, since they belong to a speaker’s knowledge of 
linguistic convention. As he says about a lexical item:
Even when all its attested values are plausibly analyzed as instantiations of a single 
abstract schema, or as extensions from a single prototype, there is no way to predict 
from the schema or prototype alone precisely which array of instantiations or exten-
sions – out of all the conceivable ones – happen to be conventionally exploited within 
the speech community (Langacker 1987: 370). 
Specifically, Langacker opts for a “unified” account which “requires the listing of all 
conventionally established values of a lexical item, as a minimal description of the 
empirical data”. The next step is “an analysis of how the category is structured, 
i.e. how the different senses are related to one another”. There are two principal types 
of relationship to be accommodated in the model: “elaboration (the relation between 
a schema and its instantiations) and extension (the relation between prototypical 
and peripheral values)”. The resulting network model “incorporates (as schemas) 
whatever generalizations can be extracted from specific instances and reflects the 
many categorizing judgments through which the complex category has evolved”. 
Thus, Langacker’s network model of a complex category comprises two kinds of 
categorisation – by schema and by prototype – “as aspects of a unified phenomenon” 
(Langacker 1987: 370–371).
Langacker also comments on the notion of a lexical item:
To the extent that a semantic network with common symbolization approximates 
a coherent category, we can reasonably speak of a lexical item. Despite its conveni-
ence, however, this construct is more a descriptive fiction than a natural unit of 
linguistic organization. Not only is coherence inherently a matter of degree, but also 
the definition allows a single network to be divided into lexical items in multiple 
and mutually inconsistent ways. I regard this as a realistic characterization of the 
phenomena in question (Langacker 1987: 388).
As opposed to Langacker, Lakoff does not provide a general discussion5 of the struc-
ture of “natural categories of senses” (Lakoff 1987: 418). He states, however, what 
a representation of such categories requires from an analyst:
1. One must provide a representation for the central subcategory and representations 
for each of the noncentral subcategories, since there are no general principles 
that can predict the noncentral cases from the central case.
2. A theory of motivation is required, since the noncentral subcategories are neither 
arbitrary nor predictable from the central subcategory.
5 As he says: “I generally prefer not to engage in methodological discussions and would rather 
just get on with my work” (Lakoff 1990: 39).
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3. A theory of the types of links between the central and noncentral subcategories 
 is required.
4. […] an adequate account of these links requires an experientialist theory of 
meaningful [sic] thought and reason” (Lakoff 1987: 379).
In standard use, Lakoff’s expression “natural categories of senses” would be probably 
understood diachronically as historically related families of senses (an extensional 
definition). However, since his declared goal is “psychological reality”, the related-
ness in question refers not to historical, but to psychological links. For Langacker, 
“cognitive reality” means something quite general: that a given model of linguistic 
usage should be in agreement with noncontroversial psychological assumptions. 
Lakoff, however, invokes a speculative notion of “image schema”,6 which in his 
model serves the role of the central or prototypical schema (an abstract definition, 
a relatively unspecified concept), while all nodes are related to it by various mental 
links. Thus, his model of linguistic usage is not supposed to be merely in agreement 
with some general psychological operations (e.g. abstraction, comparison); it is 
supposed to be a hypothesis about a real-life generation of meanings prior to lan-
guage (linguistic convention merely provides labels for some results of independent 
psychological processes).7
As concerns the representation of polysemy, Lakoff offers an abstract schema 
(prototype), which is subsequently specified along a number of dimensions. A set 
of resulting schemas (images, concepts) give rise to further schemas via certain 
hypothetical mental transformations. In essence, Lakoff’s radial model is based 
on a set of features (in that respect it is similar to the generativist approach) and 
it involves mental transformations represented mostly in an imagistic way. Thus – 
in a striking opposition to Langacker’s account – it is focused on “the underlying 
reality of language”, rather than on its surface manifestations.
Langacker offers a format for attested senses which is flexible enough to capture 
any meanings (construals). Since he aims at an adequate description of available 
linguistic material, he is far from basing his account on any pre-linguistic structures, 
transformations or transfers (even though he does accept in general that concepts 
are prior to a linguistic expression and conventionalization). His “schemas” are 
constructed on the basis of actual lexical extensions as opposed to Lakoff’s image-
6 Developed in some detail by Johnson (1987). Despite suggestions to the contrary by Lakoff and 
others, image schemas have a completely different function within his theory than Langacker’s 
schemas in his network model, cf. Tuggy (2007) on schemas, and Oakley (2007) on image 
schemas. Tuggy summarises the aspects of image schemas which draw Lakoff’s attention:
 their constant recurrence, their basis in bodily experience and thus their direct meaningful-
ness, their gestaltish nature (Lakoff 1987: 272), their “preconceptual structuring” (292–93), 
their universality in human experience (302, 312), and their ubiquity in language use (272) 
[thus] for Lakoff, image schemas are “central truths” (296) (Tuggy 2007: 85). 
7 As expressed by Lakoff and Johnson: “A portion of the conceptual network of battle partially 
characterizes the concept of an argument, and the language follows suit” (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980: 7).
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schemas, which are supposed to underlie any extensions (whether they are expressed 
in a language, or not).
As for the prototype, Lakoff’s model develops from the centre in various direc-
tions (apparently, to reach attested senses). His choice of an unspecified schema as 
the category prototype seems to be required by the format: it would be a much more 
demanding task (if not an impossible one) to derive a set of divergent meanings from 
a more specific schema. Langacker avoids the problem of the category prototype. 
In his format any schema motivating extensions is a prototype: categories have as 
many prototypes as proposed extensions. 
At this stage, let me briefly return to the problem signalled before: what is the 
nature of a linguistic category (a CLU)? I have already pointed out that both Taylor’s 
and Rúa’s terms (“reflexive” and “meta-”, respectively) do not go to the heart of the 
matter. Their proposals make some sense because they point to a central feature of 
relevant phenomena: since linguistic items are used to categorise (in the folk rather 
than expert meaning of the term), a category of such items is somehow a second-
level entity. Can one make this any clearer?
If a term is a particular “take” on a state of affairs (signatum or concept), then 
a polysemous CLU is a set of formally and genetically related “takes” on a variety of 
situations. When one asks about “sameness in difference” of such a category, one tries 
to find some commonality in such continuous acts of “taking”. We could call this 
commonality the “expressive potential” of a linguistic item, realized by a linguistic 
community in its history. From this point of view, a linguistic category is “reflexive”, 
but not in the “meta-” sense, i.e. its make-up is not the result of some external order-
ing (e.g. a theory). It is reflexive because acts of extension are judged to be continuous 
with some previous “takes”. The element of judgement is contextual: an innovative 
speaker accepts (post factum) that the symbolic form she has used conveys well her 
intention in given circumstances. The birth of a new “sense” is the result of a more 
general acceptance of the form’s particular expressive application.
Against this background, one can point out that neither Langacker, nor Lakoff 
are interested in the historical development of the expressive potential of a CLU. 
Langacker declares to be concerned with “cognitive reality” – semantic connections 
established by contemporary speakers. From this perspective, a network model is an 
imaginative reconstruction of potential semantic links between established “senses”. 
It is “imaginative”, since Langacker openly declares that “cognitive reality” can be 
modelled only “in principle”, rather than “in fact”:
although the precise configuration of the network is variable [from speaker to speak-
er – A.P.] and even indeterminate, the need to postulate some type of network is 
seemingly beyond dispute (Langacker 1988: 135). 
Lakoff, on the other hand, offers a theoretical reconstruction of potential semantic 
links based on the assumption (in the case of over) that a fairly indeterminate “im-
age schema” can be “imagistically” specified and transformed, while the results can 
be metaphorically extended.
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6. An assessment of network modelling
When one aims to model semantic structures (whether psychological, or social, 
or logical), one works on the basis of contemporary intuitions. Any such model will 
reflect our present grasp of semantic relations: either in an active mind solving some 
problems, or in the intersubjective domain – the conventional world of a linguistic 
community8 – or in an abstract conceptual system. Consequently, following Saus-
sure’s position, network models should aim to represent contemporary intuitions 
concerning the relatedness of lexically available senses. To be sure, one could try 
to see how such a system works in individual minds (psychology) or whether it can 
be formalised (logic), but the point of network models is to show in a transparent 
way what is socially available – what the linguistic system offers its users.9 From this 
perspective, it is imperative to distinguish “attested senses” from nonce uses or 
contextual construals (or social langue from individual parole).
The CL characterisation of the difference between both levels in terms of “cognitive 
salience”, “entrenchment” or “sanction” is inadequate, since those terms do not prop-
erly capture the social dimension. Individual “cognitive salience” or “entrenchment” 
do not count for much in intersubjective spaces: one must be able to rely on some senses 
as available to the other party. “Sanction” sounds closer to the mark; still, it is not 
enough to claim that some meanings serve as schemas for elaborations or as points of 
departure for extensions (Langacker’s account). Attested senses actually give structure 
to our common world and to discourse, while Langacker’s format seems designed for 
an abstract conceptual space, divorced from any role in structuring reality.
Following Saussure’s account, one must ask, however, whether language users 
have intuitions concerning the relatedness of senses. Since they use language, they 
know what words mean in a context; they will also say whether creative uses make 
sense to them. They cannot normally provide “definitions”, except for rudimentary 
statements concerning the “type” or “function” of an entity (“it is a kind of…”, 
“it is for…”). They will say that two uses are different when they bring to mind suf-
ficiently distant or distinct situations. To give an example, the verb tease has four 
sub-entries in a dictionary: 
(1) To laugh at someone and make jokes in order to have fun by embarrassing them; 
(2) To deliberately annoy an animal; 
(3) To deliberately make someone sexually excited without intending to have sex 
with them; (4) (AmE) To comb your hair in the opposite direction to which it 
grows, so that it looks thicker (Longman Dictionary 2003).
8 Or Saussure’s “social mind”. Cognitivists normally find such holistic notions unacceptable as 
“metaphysical” (cf. Talmy 1995). Of course, “social mind” is a metaphor but it rightly suggests 
that a linguistic community relies on an intersubjectively available semantic system (which 
cognitivists try to reconstruct atomistically, on the level of individual minds).
9 Historical uses can be integrated into such models – e.g. kluka, kluczka in Tabakowska’s model 
of KLUCZ / KEY (1995: 51) – since one can try to “revitalize” any words (i.e. to connect them 
conceptually to “live” senses). To be “socially available”, however, they must be felt to structure 
reality.
network models: an assessment 53
The last sense is clearly distinct and highly specific. Sense (2) could seem – in gen-
eral – not distinct from (1), if one did not know that “teasing” animals takes quite 
specific forms (e.g. enraging them with a stick), which normally express an altogether 
different attitude than (1).10 Sense (3) seems least distinct to a Polish speaker, possibly 
because this “situation type” – even if equally common – is not elaborated on in the 
intersubjective sphere (while in English there are related expressions, e.g. striptease). 
It seems, then, that two uses are sufficiently distinct when they are felt to structure 
some domains differently in a socially available way. The example of “calendar month” 
and “four week month” – according to Croft and Cruse, possibly two closest ambigu-
ous senses (Croft, Cruse 2004: 115) – seems to confirm this formulation, since they 
provide two different “recipes” for social activity.
Consequently, the transfer of a sense to a different objective domain is not enough 
to get a distinct sense, e.g. one can play with a child or with a dog; one can tease 
a child and a dog in sense (1). Teasing in sense (2) refers to a different kind of activ-
ity (which may be also applied to interpersonal relations) rather than to a different 
objective domain. Crucially, this type (tease 2) is not just “conceived” as a possibil-
ity – it is actually “perceived” as a socially recognized situation. Once we accept 
this, we can easily discount putative cases of polysemy, like eating “with a spoon, 
fork, chopsticks etc.”, since they all refer to the same kind of activity (performed 
with different tools). To conclude, a distinct sense brings to mind a different situa-
tion type because it has helped to structure it. Situation type is the third element or 
rather the basis on which the Saussurean articulation is founded.
When we return now to the relatedness of distinct senses, we can see, perhaps, why 
the entries for tease are ordered in the way proposed by lexicographers: sense (4) – 
apart from the fact that it is a regional variety – is most strongly embedded in a highly 
specified situation type; sense (3) – less so, and so on. One can imagine, perhaps, 
societies in which (2) would be more popular11 than (1) – in such a case, it could 
serve as the “default” use out of context. On this basis, one can speculate that the 
intuitive relatedness of senses is linked to the intuitive order of situation types, or 
their social salience. 
As concerns the development of such complex categories, this is a social, his-
torical process of establishing common perspectives. It involves extended uses of 
words, which tend to cluster around referentially salient specimens. Astronomical 
star and celebrity star – since both are currently salient – provide good reference 
points for related uses. The extension from the astronomical to the celebrity sense is 
normally classified as a metaphor and explained as an analogical use, e.g. ‘as a star 
catches one’s attention in the sky, so an actor catches the attention of the public’. 
10 The difference is lexicalized in Polish: przekomarzać się (‘tease 1’) as opposed to drażnić 
(‘tease 2’), which suggests ‘courting danger’.
11 It may seem that frequency of occurrence normally correlates with social salience. One can 
imagine, however, that tease 3 is statistically the most popular activity of all four, while not 
being salient because of some social prohibitions. Tease 4, even if generally performed on 
a daily basis, would be always less socially salient than (1)-(3) because of its relatively minor 
social status (as long as one’s hair-do is perceived as less important than one’s attitude to 
people or animals).
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This explanation is a hysteron proteron one: it is based on our present intuitions, 
partly shaped by the existence of the sense in question. When pressed, however, we 
could imagine a number of different scenarios underlying this extension. What is 
more, since a lexeme normally carries many senses, several of them can usually serve 
as a point of departure for a given extension. Additionally, idiosyncratic extensions 
(reflecting particular circumstances of use, rather than socially recognized func-
tional and structural similarities) sometimes “make it” into general use. Historical 
vagaries cannot be really “explained”, as they often exemplify situational serendipity 
or groping in the dark or confabulation. Thus, diachronic evidence rarely provides 
a clear-cut or unique motivation in single cases. What it does offer is some sense of 
the complexity of the process – involving an interplay of form, content and back-
ground – as well as some patterns of development.
More specifically, when one views a perspicuous representation of a complex 
category – e.g. KLUCZ / KEY (Tabakowska 1995: 51) – one notices that the contem-
porary central sense took over this role at some point in history. There are two earlier 
clusters: UNPREDICTABLE MOVEMENT, as exemplified by kluczenie (‘disguising 
one’s tracks’, ‘moving in circles’) and CURVED OBJECT, as exemplified by kluka 
(‘a curved rod’). Both are linked by the idea of “curvature”, which brings to mind 
unpredictability or devious behaviour. With the passage of time, a range of items 
expressing “deviousness” and “curvature” fell into abeyance, and the idea of “provid-
ing access” took central stage.12 
Since the developmental history of a complex category is hidden from view of lan-
guage users (and, as a rule, not completely transparent even to experts), the intuitive 
relatedness of senses apparently reflects social salience of situation types co-structured 
by a given lexeme. As the example of tease suggests, however, it is much easier to 
point out local senses – structuring narrowly defined or marginal situations – than 
to offer a convincing argument for one central sense among a number of candidates, 
or for a hierarchy of extensions. From this vantage point it is easier to understand the 
futility of attempts to justify on some theoretical grounds the priority of one sense 
of over (Lakoff 1987) or to distinguish “in a principled way” a set of distinct senses 
(cf. Tyler, Evans 2003). The senses are distinguished intuitively, on the basis of our 
everyday orientation in situation types.
At this point, we can perhaps better see the continuity between the structur-
alist monosemy position and the cognitivist polysemy position: the former one 
abstracts from the vagaries of language in use (parole) and aims to accommodate 
all situational applications to the most general sense/s one can posit; the latter one 
accepts the general senses (prototypes), while trying to trace their extensions on 
the basis of various psychological assumptions. Since both schools distance them-
selves from historical reality, they do not appreciate the situational embededdness 
of a CLU’s polysemy.
12 It seems that other lexical items “took over” some senses expressed by this category, e.g. one 
of the senses of kluczka is expressed by contemporary mieć haka na kogoś (‘to have a hook 
against sb’, cf. the entry klucz in Brückner’s dictionary). To be sure, ‘deviousness’ is still present 
in some uses.
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Thus, even though both foundational network models offer rather different ac-
counts of meaning extension – Lakoff bases his model of over on an unspecified 
“imagistic” schema, which is subsequently specified in several (largely arbitrary) di-
mensions and transformed according to hypothetical mental rules; Langacker offers 
a highly flexible format based on schematic similarity, underlying both specifications 
of a schema and extensions from a prototype – neither of the models is presented 
as “diachronic”, while both authors invoke “psychological reality” (in a rather dif-
ferent meaning of the term) as their declared goal. Moreover, Langacker points to 
“descriptive adequacy” as his primary aim and is at places quite confusing about 
the synchronic status of the model (cf. Łozowski 1999 for a critique).
My conclusion at this stage is perhaps entirely predictable. Since historical 
processes involve an interplay of formal structures, conceptual structures and the 
background, they cannot be properly represented by formats focused primarily 
on conceptual structure, even if these are offered as “dynamic”, as underlying real 
developments (if not in history, then certainly in mental life and in discourse). 
Still, if the formats are found useful by linguists (as seems evident and as has been 
partly documented), they should allow them to capture a “summation” of historical 
processes from a particular angle.
Generally speaking, Langacker’s format seems more promising in this respect, 
since it posits few formal requirements. As such – in skilful hands – it can be used 
to represent functional clusters and their intuitive conceptual unity from the present 
perspective. Lakoff’s model may also be found inspiring, since it invokes pragmatic 
factors (mostly of a perceptual kind), which are obviously operative in history. 
This conclusion may come as a denouement, but the fact that a new type of format 
has been proposed (as an alternative to the criterial-attribute analysis) could be in 
the long run more significant than the actual justifications offered for it.
To conclude, network models exemplify a search for linguistics with “a human face”. 
CL, within which they were developed, extended research horizons after Chomsky’s 
formalist approach, while being rooted in the mentalistic background (common to the 
first and the second generation cognitive science). Thus, network models represent the 
relatedness of lexical senses on the basis of some general or speculative psychological 
constraints and intuitively evident conceptual relations. The amount of work performed 
within the cognitive paradigm testifies to the intellectual potential of this approach.
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